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This study examines public support for a key contested multicultural policy in contemporary 
Europe: the provision of religious schools. It makes two main contributions, one substantive and 
one theoretical. Substantively, the main contribution is to provide new experimental evidence 
demonstrating the existence of discrimination against Muslims on a central issue of multicultural 
social policy. Theoretically, the main contribution is to propose an explanation for variations in 
patterns of discrimination that highlights the role of individuals’ motivation to control prejudice. 
Through moderation analysis, we show that individuals who express stronger motivation to 
control prejudice are more likely to treat Muslim and Christian requests for religious schools 
equally, and they are more likely to retain their support for Muslim schools in the wake of a 
threatening Islamist terrorist incident. Because we conducted the experiments in three countries, 
we in addition find societal-level patterns of variation: Individuals’ motivation to control 
prejudice is more strongly associated with non-discriminatory responses to the question of 
religious schools where a more multicultural path of accommodation has been pursued. This 
societal-level variation raises new hypotheses about how multicultural policies may interact with 
public opinion, and underlines the importance of comparative experimental work.  
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The integration of new minority groups has been a pressing issue on the European political 
agenda since at least the 1980s. The past decade or so has seen a marked change in this debate 
away from general questions about migrants and ethnic minorities towards specific concerns 
about Muslims and Islam (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Helbling et al. 2014a; Sniderman et 
al, 2014). In many European countries, Muslims now constitute the largest and most socially 
distinctive minority group: they are the group that faces the most resistance to accommodation 
from the majority populations, and attract the most political opposition, particularly from actors 
on the radical and extreme right (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012; Berntzen and 
Weisskircher 2016). Conflicts over multiculturalism in Europe increasingly focus on practical 
dilemmas about whether, and how, to accommodate the beliefs, practices, and preferences of 
Muslim minorities - sometimes in the face of scepticism or outright hostility from the majority.  
But what is the role of anti-Muslim sentiment or bias in these controversies? Public 
debate rarely justifies policy opposition on the grounds of explicit dislike of Muslims, but instead 
invokes more socially acceptable justifications for opposing multicultural accommodation. Some 
Europeans may oppose public accommodations for Muslim practices on principled, group-
neutral grounds (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) such as secularism (Imhoff and Recker 
2012), universalism (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014), or liberal support for individual autonomy and 
gender equality (Gustavsson et al. 2016). Research in multiple European countries shows that 
negativity toward Muslims is widespread in public attitudes (Helbling 2014a), but do all citizens 
allow anti-Muslim bias to shape policy positions? Prior studies in the United States have found 
that individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to allow their 
implicit bias to shape their intergroup attitudes (e.g., Dunton and Fazio; Plant and Devine 1998), 
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but few studies exist that demonstrate whether motivation to control prejudice can reduce 
discriminatory responses to multicultural policy in Europe. 
In this study, we provide evidence of discrimination in public support for multicultural 
accommodation in the context of a concrete policy issue—state support for Muslim schools. In 
three Western European countries in which state-supported Christian schools exist—Britain, 
Norway, and Sweden—we find substantial opposition to granting the same rights to Muslims. 
Using a randomized controlled experiment, we show that a substantively significant portion of 
this opposition in Britain and Norway is specifically “targeted” against only Muslim schools, i.e. 
it is opposition directed at Muslim schools that does not extend to other religious or non-
universal private schools.  
Nevertheless, we also find that some individuals resist discrimination, even under 
conditions of heightened threat. Individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice do not 
systematically exhibit the same degree of targeted opposition to Muslim schools exhibited by 
those low in motivation. In Norway and Britain, the gap in public support for Muslim vs. 
Christian schools is nearly eliminated among those highest in motivation to control prejudice, 
while the gap is completely eliminated or even reversed among highly motivated Swedish 
citizens. Further evidence from a natural experiment shows that many British respondents 
reacted to a Muslim terrorist attack by reducing support for Muslim schools, while support levels 
among those high in motivation to control prejudice were not affected.  
Europeans’ attitudes toward multicultural policies accommodating Muslims 
Most previous work on policy conflicts about multiculturalism (Bleich, 2011) and views 
of Muslims (Helbling, 2014a) has examined the issues involved in an abstract and general way, 
focusing on questions about principles and overall frameworks (Wright et al. 2016). While 
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research and theorizing at this level is indispensable, this dominant approach departs from the 
ways in which multicultural conflicts are often discussed in politics and experienced by citizens. 
Focusing on a concrete political controversy over an everyday issue presents multicultural 
accommodation in more familiar terms, and hence provides clearer evidence on who will 
accommodate real minority demands in a multicultural society.  A general focus may conflate 
two related but distinct policy debates: as Joppke (2017) notes, “…[C]ivic integration is national-
level policy while persistent multiculturalist policies tend to be local level, so that both may 
coexist.” 
A few recent studies examine attitudes toward specific multicultural policies or practices. 
However, these remain exceptions to the rule (Wright et al. 2016); moreover, most focus on 
attitudes toward Muslim religious garb such as the hijab, niqab, or burqa (Breton and Eady 2015, 
Helbling 2014b, Gustavsson et al. 2016). We focus on the issue of state support for religious 
schools, a prominent example of the conflicts over multicultural accommodation that are 
multiplying in European and North American education systems, yet one that has seen little 
systematic study. The most closely related studies examine the issue of support for including 
Islam in religious education curricula. Van der Noll and Saroglou (2014) find that 27% of a 
German sample supported teaching about Christianity but not Islam; Statham (2016) finds 
greater support for teaching about Christianity than for similar teaching about Islam in four 
European countries. 
 Despite the paucity of prior research, school policy provides a useful issue context for 
examining attitudes toward multicultural policy. The three countries in our study—Britain, 
Sweden, and Norway—have all seen on-going controversy over the existence of Muslim schools 
and/or multicultural practices in educational settings, such as disputes over teachers and students 
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wearing religious dress, Muslim parents seeking exemptions on religious grounds from activities 
such as swimming lessons, and the serving of Halal meat in school cafeterias. But while other 
issues involve aspects of Muslim practice that lack a clear parallel among Christian or secular 
majority groups, the schools issue allows for a straightforward comparison in willingness to 
grant precisely the same set of rights to different groups. A pattern in which citizens oppose 
Muslim schools while supporting other types of religious or particularistic schools would provide 
unusually straightforward evidence of discrimination. Moreover, religious schooling is an 
established part of each country’s educational system. Given this status quo, a legal change to 
ban or inhibit Muslim schools would constitute discrimination in a straightforward legal sense, 
even if supported by a majority of the population.  
Patterns of Opposition: Targeting Muslims, or School Types? 
Of course, observed opposition to Muslim schools does not provide evidence of 
discrimination per se. Opponents of Muslim schools may not prefer discrimination—they might 
not support Christian schools either. Thus, we first ask whether opposition to Muslim schools is 
specifically targeted toward Muslims. Given the array of negative attitudes toward Muslims 
among majority-group Europeans (Helbling, 2014a, Storm et al. 2017), we expect an element of 
targeted opposition to Muslim schools. In other words, we expect that public opposition toward 
state sponsorship of distinctive schools will be more widespread when the policy concerns 
Muslim schools than when it concerns Christian schools or non-religious independent or ‘free’ 
schools.  
On the other hand, we may find that opposition stems mainly from general principles or 
values that influence preferences for school policy overall, rather than from targeted opposition 
to Muslim schools in particular. The literature offers at least two notable principles that lead to 
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divergent predictions at the aggregate level. First, opposition to Muslim schools may also be 
rooted in secularism (Imhoff and Recker 2012). Dedicated secularists among majority-group 
Europeans would consistently oppose religious schools, for the dominant Christian group in 
society as well for the Muslim minority. Second, non-targeted opposition to Muslim schools 
might arise from a form of egalitarianism or universalism (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014). 
Universalists would go further than secularists, opposing all forms of education, such as private 
or selective schools as well as religious schools, that depart from the ideal of all children 
receiving the same education from institutions with identical values and selection processes. The 
cross-national controlled survey experiment described in greater detail below is well suited to 
detecting the existence and extent of targeted opposition to Muslim schools, allowing us to 
compare levels of targeted opposition to Muslim schools to opposition to Christian schools 
(secularism) and private schools (universalism). 
Does motivation to control prejudice reduce tendency to discriminate? 
Targeted opposition is clearly discriminatory it involves denying religious schools to 
Muslims but supporting the provision of identical schools to Christians. As such, if we find a 
significant degree of targeted opposition on the aggregate level this is substantively important. 
But discrimination of this kind may vary between citizens. What distinguishes those who 
discriminate from those who do not? Prior research suggests that at least a partial answer may lie 
in individual motivations to behave in accordance with social norms against prejudice. 
According to the logic of “dual process” models of prejudice (Devine 1989), individuals who are 
highly motivated to control or avoid prejudice are more likely to prevent any underlying biases 
and stereotypes from shaping their policy preferences. Recent research on intergroup attitudes 
widely acknowledges the usefulness of the dual process models, which is increasingly common 
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in social science research (Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). According to this logic, 
individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice (corresponding in dual process jargon 
to “system two”; or “thinking slow”) are more likely to prevent any underlying biases and 
stereotypes (corresponding to “system one;” or “thinking fast”) from shaping their policy 
preferences.  
It is important to clarify the nature of motivation to control prejudice (MCP) in 
relationship to conventional concepts of prejudice. Previous research has demonstrated that 
motivation to control prejudice (MCP) is conceptually and empirically distinct from both implicit 
and explicit prejudice (Payne et al. 2005, Butz and Plant 2009). Conceptually, a motivation 
represents an objective or orientation toward action, whereas prejudice is usually imagined as a 
negative attitude toward an outgroup, or perhaps as set of pejorative beliefs about outgroup 
members. Empirically, as would be theoretically expected, there is a relationship between MCP 
and traditional prejudice measures: participants high in internal motivation to control prejudice 
(IMCP)1 score lower on explicit prejudice measures (Devine et al 2002, Amodio, Devine, and 
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Hausmann and Ryan, 2004). This is to be expected, because MCP should 
lead to active (“system two”) attempt to avoid acting upon any underlying biases. But IMCP 
does not eliminate automatically activated underlying prejudice from the “system one” cognitive 
process, as a significant portion of high IMCP participants nonetheless exhibit a relatively high 
degree of bias on measures of implicit prejudice (Devine et al 2002). High IMCP individuals also 
seem to respond more effectively to implicit prejudice reduction programs (Cooley 2018).  
Rather than treating “social desirability” effects as a nuisance term that gets in the way of 
measuring true underlying prejudice, dual process models of prejudice incorporate motivation to 
                                                          




conform to anti-prejudice norms directly into our understanding of what constitutes prejudice 
and what drives prejudiced behavior. Such models provide a coherent account of the lack of 
association between explicit and implicit measures of prejudice: automatically activated 
stereotypes and negative biases are widely held, but individuals vary in their motivation to 
control these automatic forms of prejudice.  Those who are highly motivated to control the 
expression of implicit prejudice are most likely not to discriminate even if they harbor negative 
implicit biases inside or outside of conscious awareness (Dunton and Fazio 1997, Plant and 
Devine 1998). 
Although MCP reflects a goal of conforming to a particular social norm against 
prejudice, and is more likely to be found among those with more political tolerance in general, it 
is not reducible to a general tendency to engage in socially desirable behavior. Studies show little 
to no positive correlation between MCP and traditional measures of social desirability (Plant and 
Devine 1998, Ivarsflaten et al. 2010). Moreover, previous research has shown that subjects who 
are high in internal motivation to control prejudice continue to act in non-prejudiced ways even 
when others cannot observe or sanction their behavior (Butz and Plant 2009). For example, 
subjects who are internally motivated to respond without prejudice are not more likely to endorse 
stereotypes of black people in private than they are in public (Fazio et al. 1995; Plant, Devine, 
and Brazy, 2003).  
Anti-prejudice motivations have mostly been researched to examine the dynamics of 
racial prejudice and other form of discrimination in the US (Butz and Plant 2009), but some 
studies conducted in Europe have employed this concept to explain otherwise puzzling patterns 
of support for the extreme right (Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten, 2013; Harteveldt and Ivarsflaten 
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2018). Building from this work, we hypothesize that motivation to control prejudice is likely to 
moderate any tendency to discriminate against Muslims in the question of schools. 
Discrimination in the Wake of Terror 
We have also examined whether and how discriminatory responses to Muslim schools in 
Britain was affected by the Paris terror attacks of November 2015, the worst terror incident 
Europe had experienced for over a decade. Previous research has shown that threatening events 
can produce a wider backlash, as occurred in Britain following the 9/11 attacks on the United 
States (Meer and Modood 2009). We might expect, then, that news of a violent attack committed 
by Islamist terrorists may increase targeted opposition to Muslim schools. 
On the other hand, a hostile backlash is not a foregone conclusion. For example, an 
expected backlash against Muslims in American public opinion after 9/11 did not initially 
materialize, perhaps due to an elite consensus that sharply distinguished Islamist terrorism from 
Islam in general (Panagopolous 2006). If motivation to control prejudice works as theory 
suggests, then it should shore up commitments to avoid discrimination, even under the pressure 
of a more salient threat. British media was at the time filled with calls from elite and media 
figures across the political spectrum who encouraged people to resist the temptation to blame all 
Muslims for the acts of a tiny extremist minority. In theory, British people with high levels of 
motivation to control prejudice should be more likely to heed these calls and maintain their prior 
attitudes toward Muslim schools. Thus, we hypothesize that (a) the Paris attacks will generate 
additional opposition to Muslims schools among those low in IMCP, but (b) that IMCP will act 
as a countervailing force, such that these higher levels of opposition will be observed only 
among those with little or no motivation to control prejudice. 
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Data and Methods 
 
The data in the study come from embedding similar experiments in surveys conducted in each of 
the three countries, once in Norway and Sweden and twice in Britain. In Britain, the experiment 
was run on the YouGov opt-in internet panel in November 2015 as part of a specially 
commissioned survey on Muslim integration, and then repeated immediately after the Paris terror 
attacks. In Sweden, the experiment was run on wave four of the Swedish Citizen Panel (March-
April 2012), an opt-in internet panel owned by the University of Gothenburg. And in Norway, 
the experiment was run on wave four of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (March 2015), a randomly 
recruited, academic-purpose internet panel owned by the University of Bergen. The sample sizes 
were approximately 130 people per treatment condition in Sweden, 350 in Britain, and 400 in 
Norway. The British YouGov opt-in sample is representative by design (Twyman 2008). The 
Norwegian Citizen Panel sample relies on random recruitment from high-quality population 
registers. There are some biases in the resulting sample, which we have addressed through 
controls in the moderation analysis (Høgestøl and Skjervheim 2015). The Swedish sample is opt-
in and is known to over-represent men and more educated, liberal, and high-income respondents 
(Martinsson et al. 2013).2 
The differences between the panels make us cautious about comparing the level of 
commitment to anti-prejudice norms in between countries in a strict sense and about generalizing 
to the publics in the countries as whole. In particular, the caution is advised with regards to 
generalizing the main effect result reported below in the case of Sweden. Because of the nature 
of biases in this sample, the survey may overstate the overall levels of commitment to equal 
                                                          
2 The demographics of the Norwegian and Swedish Citizen Panels are described in the cited methodology reports 
(Høgestøl and Skjervheim 2015; Martinsson et al. 2013).  The British YouGov panel is representative on core 
demographics by design (Twyman 2008). 
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treatment of Muslims, and as our analysis shows this can lead to an underestimation of the 
tendency to discriminate in the Swedish population more generally.  Similar biases, although 
somewhat less severe, are also present in the Norwegian sample and so similar caution applies 
with regards to the generalizability of findings to the country as a whole.    
Core Experimental Design and Natural Experiment 
We used a between-subjects experimental design to test our hypothesis regarding targeted 
opposition, secularism, and universalism. We asked respondents about state support for schools, 
and randomly assigned respondents to be asked about different types of schools—Christian, 
Muslim, or “free schools.” Within each country, questions posed to respondents were identical 
aside from the experimental manipulation of school type. Across countries, the content of the 
question was the same but the wording was somewhat different in order to sound appropriate in 
each language and setting. This approach follows the lead of past target group experiments used 
to study prejudice, tolerance, and its impact on policy preferences in the US and Europe (e.g 
Brooks and Manza 2013: Ch. 4; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Harell 2010; Petersen et al. 
2011). The between-subjects design eliminates consistency pressures on respondents that might 
dampen the gaps in support between Muslim and Christian education in prior studies (Statham 
2016, Van der Noll and Saroglou 2014).3 The surveys were fielded online in all three countries, a 
survey mode which has been found to reduce social desirability bias in responses on sensitive 
topics (Kreuter et al. 2008, Gnambs and Kaspar, 2015). 
 In addition to the three-country experimental design, we made use of a natural 
experiment of sorts arising from the tragedy of the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. 
                                                          
3 As it turns out, our effect size for Britain turns out to be proportionally larger than Statham’s, consistent with 
consistency pressures dampening differences in his study, although our main effects findings on Britain are 
otherwise consistent with his (Statham 2016). 
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By coincidence, the survey containing our experiment was in the field in Britain just prior to 
these attacks. To gauge the response of the British public to the attack in relation to our research 
questions, we fielded the same questions again in the days following the attack. Because the 
surveys were fielded so close in time, with the attack dominating news coverage in the interim, 
we can have reasonable confidence that the changes we observe are a result of the attack and the 
heightened atmosphere of threat in its wake, as discussed above.  
Measurement of Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice 
We measured motivation to control prejudice through a series of previously validated items 
probing whether or not respondents have internalised being non-prejudiced as a personal goal or 
motivation. A representative item asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: “I get 
angry with myself if I have a prejudiced thought.” (See the Appendix for the full set of questions.) 
Prior psychometric validation studies have confirmed that this Internal Motivation to Control 
Prejudice (IMCP) scale is a valid and reliable measure in both the US and European contexts; in 
particular, IMCP is uncorrelated with more generalized tendencies to adjust one’s behavior to 
social norms or social contexts, such as social desirability or self-monitoring, in both the US (Plant 
and Devine 1998) and Europe (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010). Shortened IMCP scales have 
been validated and shown to predict political attitudes and vote choice in Britain and Germany 
(Blinder, Ivarsflaten, and Ford 2013). The precise set of questions varied somewhat from country 
to country. Most notably, the British version included questions that asked specifically about 
Muslims, while the others were oriented more broadly toward “immigrants” or the anti-prejudice 
norm in general. All results for Britain were robust to an alternative specification of IMCP omitting 
the Muslim-specific questions (see table A2.2 in the Appendix). Care was taken in question 
ordering to minimize priming-effects of the IMCP questions, in light of prior work in which pre-
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priming respondents arguably distorted experimental effects (Huber and Lipinski 2006, 
Mendelberg 2008). In the Swedish and British samples this meant that the IMCP items were 
administered after the experiment. In the Norwegian sample, they were administered at a separate 
point in time.4 
Country Selection 
 Along with Britain, the choice of these three countries provides further leverage toward 
understanding connections between opposition to Muslim schools and to prejudice and/or anti-
prejudice norms. Sweden and Norway are close to one another and distant from Britain not only 
geographically, but also in terms of their coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
although see Schneider and Paunescu 2012), their more comprehensive welfare states (Esping-
Anderson 2013), their languages, and other politically relevant dimensions. Sweden and Norway 
are also among the most egalitarian nations in the world when it comes to gender roles (Inglehart 
and Norris 2003). 
Sweden and Norway are also similar to one another in their historical and current 
approaches to education, the policy area we are examining. In all three countries, large numbers 
of primary and secondary schools were originally run by Christian churches and then gradually 
(and not without controversy) taken over by the state. However, in both Scandinavian countries, 
schools were first taken over by states and later secularized. All schools are still publicly 
financed and strictly regulated by national curricula, but both countries have more recently 
enacted major reforms (in 1992 for Sweden, 2003 for Norway) to enable private entities to run 
                                                          
4 This latter choice is what we believe to be best practice in moderation analysis, but it was not feasible in the studies 
fielded in Britain and Sweden. We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the somewhat weaker associations 
between IMCP and discrimination observed in Norway is related to this design choice, and so again we advice 
caution when it comes to interpreting the differences between countries. Note however that this choice only affects 
interpretation of the moderation analysis, not the main experimental results.  
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schools. In both Sweden and Norway, confessional schools remain a marginal phenomenon, 
encompassing 1.5% and 3.4% of all primary schools, respectively. In Britain, however, a 
different bargain was struck. Educational reforms in 1944 preserved the status of church schools 
and their autonomy in the education system, while providing them with public support, an 
arrangement that has, with modifications, endured ever since. Confessional schools are a major 
part of the primary school system (37% of all schools in England). They must comply with 
national educational curriculum and intake rules, and they run alongside secular state run 
schools, which provide the majority of school places.5 
Unusually, in the midst of so many similarities, Norway differs from Sweden in one key 
respect that is critical to our study: the existing political climate around multiculturalism. Policy 
indices based on expert ratings highlight large differences between our cases in multicultural 
accommodation. Sweden scores highest  (7 out of a possible 8) on the "multiculturalism policy 
index," which documents the extent of policy accommodation for immigrant and minority 
groups, including bilingual and multicultural educational curricula, religious exemptions to dress 
codes, and mandates for representation of ethnic minorities in public media (Tolley and Vonk, 
2016; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Britain scores a middling 5.5 on this index, while Norway 
scores the lowest of the three at 3.5. 
 Given this pattern, we would argue that Sweden and Norway should show similar 
patterns to one another, and distinct from Britain, if attitudes toward Muslim schools are 
primarily based on attitudes toward schooling, on attitudes toward gender roles, or on broader 
cultural determinants. However, if opposition to Muslim schools is primarily related to the 
politics of prejudice and multiculturalism, then it is Sweden that should be the tolerant outlier, 
                                                          
5 More detail on the prevalence of religious schools in each country is provided in the Appendix, table A5  
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and Britain and Norway that should show similar levels of opposition and patterns of 
connections between policy preferences and prejudice. This would provide further evidence, 




Identifying Targeted Opposition 
 
Our first question regards the sources of opposition to Muslim schools in the three countries as 
revealed in the pattern of direct effects of the survey experimental treatments. Figure 1 (a-c) 
displays the effects of the experimental manipulations in each of our three national contexts. 
They show the mean support for each school type, with responses rescaled to the unit interval. 
Higher values indicate stronger support for a given type of school. The confidence intervals are 
larger in the Swedish case, because there were fewer respondents in each condition there. 
The Swedish results show an aggregate pattern consistent with principled secularism, 
rather than targeted opposition or universalism. There is no statistically detectable difference in 
attitudes to the two kinds of religious schools, and both kinds of religious schools are less 
popular than secular private “free” schools. Just under half of respondents in the Swedish sample 
oppose each of the religious educational options.6 Despite Sweden being a Scandinavian country 
with a history of a strong universal schools system this pattern of results is not consistent with 
universalism because of the considerably higher support for non-denominational but privately 
run free schools than for religious schools. However, we must be cautious about generalizing 
                                                          
6 Table A1 in the appendix report the models behind figure 1 (a-c).  
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from our Swedish sample to the Swedish population as a whole due to the imbalances in the 
sample. 
In contrast to the Swedish results, we find strong evidence of targeted opposition in the 
British and Norwegian samples, where respondents are much less willing to support Muslim 
schools than Christian schools. The starkest results are found in Britain. Mean support for 
Muslim schools is 0.29 (s.e. = .01) on the 0-1 scale, compared to 0.62 (s.e. = .01) for Christian 
schools and 0.47 (s.e. = .01) for free schools. Differences between support for Muslim schools 
and the other two school types are both statistically significant (p < .001, two-tailed t-test). To a 
substantial degree, British opposition is targeted, rather than consistently secular or universalist: 
schools run by churches from the dominant Christian tradition are very popular, and privately 
run "free schools", though less popular, are also much more popular than Muslim schools.  
In Norway, the experiment also reveals targeted opposition to Muslim schools, although 
the differences in support for Muslim and Christian conditions are not as large as in Britain. 
Mean support for Muslim schools is 0.41 (s.e. = .02), significantly lower than the mean of 0.61 
(s.e. = .02) for Christian schools (p < .001, two-tailed t-test) and below the midpoint of the scale, 
revealing more opposition than support. The pattern of effects in Norway is also the most 
consistent with targeted opposition and inconsistent with secularism. Much as in Sweden, the 
pattern of direct effects is clearly inconsistent with universalism as well, because both private 
and Christian schools are much more strongly supported than Muslim schools, whereas a 
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The results from the experimental intervention randomly altering the school type show that 
Muslim schools face targeted opposition in two of the three countries under study - Norway and 
Britain - where Muslim schools were significantly and substantially less popular than otherwise 
identically described Christian schools. In this Swedish sample, Muslim schools are in the 
aggregate treated the same as Christian schools. However, as noted above the nature of our 
Swedish sample requires caution in generalizing this finding to the Swedish population as a 
whole. It is possible that the sample has a higher number of respondents committed to controlling 
prejudice than the country as a whole. As we will show below, individual-level variation in 
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Effects of school treatments in Norway
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Moderation by motivation to control prejudice 
While many citizens in Britain and Norway single out Muslim schools for targeted opposition, 
are highly motivated citizens more likely to treat Muslims equally? We have suggested that those 
higher in motivation to control prejudice will be more supportive of Muslim schools in general, 
and expect to see little or no targeted opposition among those high in motivation to control 
prejudice. We therefore turn now to examine whether motivation to control prejudice moderates 
the effects of the experimental conditions, and reduces the observed gap in support for Muslim 
and Christian schools. We expect motivation to control prejudice will be associated with 
relatively higher support for Muslim schools in all of our contexts while not having a significant 
relationship with support for other sorts of schools.  
Figure 2(a-c) summarizes the impact of motivation to control prejudice on support for 
Muslim and Christian schools in regression models conducted separately for each treatment 
condition and each national context.7 The figures show that IMCP has a significant impact on 
views of Muslim schools in all three countries. Meanwhile, IMCP has no effect on views of 
Christian schools in two of the countries as expected. In Britain, the effect of IMCP on support 
for Christian schools is negative: British respondents expressing higher motivation to control 
prejudice were less supportive of Christian schools. It is possible that those strongly committed 
to anti-prejudice norms worry that Christian schools, which are much more widespread in 
England than the other two contexts, put Muslims and other minority religious groups at a 
disadvantage. In all three countries, individuals with high motivation to control prejudice treat 
                                                          
7 Results from the complete regression models using continuous variables and controls for potential confounders are 
presented in the Appendix Tables A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3.  
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Muslim and Christian schools more equally. IMCP has no significant relationship with support 
for private schools in any of the three cases.8 
The positive impact of IMCP on support for Muslim schools, and the nil or negative 
effect on support for Christian schools, means that Muslim schools face less targeted opposition 
from those more motivated to control prejudice. However, this moderating effect is only strong 
enough to eliminate targeted opposition completely in the Swedish sample. Since most 
respondents in the Swedish sample also express moderate to high IMCP, the positive effect of 
IMCP on support for Muslim schools renders the overall difference in reactions to Christian and 
Muslim schools statistically insignificant in this case.  Put differently, the strong association 
between motivation to control prejudice and support for Muslim schools, combined with the 
higher levels of motivation to control prejudice expressed in the Swedish sample, can account for 
the absence of targeted opposition in the Swedish experiment overall – even though Swedish 










                                                          
8 We focus on Christian and Muslim schools for ease of interpretation. Results from all conditions are reported in 
the Appendix tables.  
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 Figure 2. Predicted effect of IMCP on support for schools  
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The IMCP moderation effect is not based on an experimental intervention and so it is 
vulnerable to omitted variable bias. In the appendix we have included tables (A2.1-A2.3) 
showing that the effect of IMCP is robust to the introduction of various demographic and 
attitudinal controls including demographic variables such as age, gender, and education. While 
these models do not eliminate the possibility of alternative moderating mechanisms, they do at 
least suggest the IMCP moderation effect is robust, and alleviate some of the concerns 
previously expressed about sampling bias, though caution is still required in generalizing the 
results reported here to the countries as a whole.  
Motivation and response to threat: Britain before and after the Paris terror attacks 
Finally, we present the results of our study of attitudes before and after the Paris terror attacks. A 
comparison of British attitudes before and immediately after the November 2015 terror attacks in 
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at different levels of IMCP in the survey conducted after Paris, compared with the baseline level 
of support found in the pre-Paris survey. These results are based on a regression modelling 
support for schools, in the Muslim condition, as function of IMCP, a dummy variable indicating 
pre- or post-attack, and an interaction between these two variables (full results in Appendix, 
Table A4).  We find that predicted support for Muslim schools is lower after the Paris attacks 
among British respondents with low IMCP (below the mean score of 0.6 on the IMCP scale), but 
is the same in both surveys among those who score above the average (i.e. the pre-attack/post-
attack difference is small and not statistically different from zero). Opposition to Muslim schools 
was higher after the attack among the section of the British public who expressed little 
motivation to control prejudice turned against Muslim schools in the aftermath of a major 
Islamist terror incident. Among those with high IMCP, however, support was similar before and 
after the attacks, consistent with the hypothesis that those motivated to control prejudice will 
resist the temptation to respond to heightened threat with increased hostility to state 
accommodation of Muslims.  
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Figure 4: British support for Muslim schools, post-Paris attacks (baseline: pre-Paris) 
 
Discussion  
The results presented demonstrate that discriminatory targeted opposition to Muslims on a 
central issue of multicultural accommodation - the provision of religious schooling – exists and 
is widespread enough to pose a serious challenge to multicultural accommodation in two of the 
three countries studied. Many majority group citizens in Britain and Norway who would provide 
religious schools to the Christian majority would deny identical schools to the Muslim minority. 
In all three countries, support for Muslim schools was considerably lower than support for 
private schools, meaning results are not consistent with the claim that opposition to Muslim 
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identical school structures. With respect to Muslim schooling, at least, the majority is willing to 
support policies that violate egalitarian standards, and instantiate not only de facto but even de 
jure discrimination.  
 Furthermore, beyond the core experimental design, a series of additional tests provide 
evidence that motivation to control prejudice can reduce or even eliminate targeted opposition. 
First, moderation analysis showed that individuals with high IMCP are more likely to support 
Muslim schools than those lower in motivation. In the Swedish sample, enough individuals have 
moderate to high levels of IMCP to essentially eliminate targeted opposition at the aggregate 
level. There are relatively fewer individuals with high levels of IMCP in Britain and Norway, but 
these individuals exhibit little to no discriminatory opposition to Muslim schools as compared to 
Christian schools. 
Second, results from a natural experiment before and after a major terror attack carried 
out by Islamists show that opposition to Muslim schools was unaffected among those with high 
IMCP, while opposition to Muslim schools was higher after the attacks among those who were 
not motivated to control prejudice. In addition, our comparative experimental design provides 
further suggestive evidence that country-level variation in prejudice and associated political and 
social norms are critical to shaping national-level patterns in targeted opposition to Muslim 
schools. These latter forms of evidence do not stem from a controlled experiment, and therefore 
do not confirm a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, we have shown that motivation to control 
prejudice is consistently associated with lower levels of anti-Muslim discrimination in a central 
issue of policy accommodation across three European contexts, and provide further insight into 
the range of conditions under which motivation may reduce discrimination, including under 
conditions of heightened threat. 
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These results have important implications for both practical and scholarly debates about 
multicultural policy, and about whether negative responses to Muslims constitute Islamophobia 
or principled objections to Muslim practices. In the midst of political debates about multicultural 
policy, it is important to understand the extent to which opposition from majority-group citizens 
is rooted in principle or in prejudice. General opposition to private or religious schooling is a 
very different issue for governments than discriminatory opposition focussed only on a 
stigmatised minority. The former is a legitimate preference that a responsive government might 
wish to accommodate; the latter would entail discrimination against citizens on the basis of 
religion, in a way that governments cannot legitimately enact into policy. Our experimental 
results provide clear evidence that opposition to accommodating Muslim demands for religious 
schools is often discriminatory, and our additional tests provide reason to suspect that anti-
Muslim prejudice is an important driver of this targeted opposition.  
Hostile views and discriminatory opposition are, however, only part of the story 
emerging from this study. We have highlighted the potentially critical role of anti-prejudice 
norms in shaping policy debates and public opinion. Our results suggest that when majority 
group members regard the equal treatment of minority groups as an important personal 
motivation, they are willing to apply this principle when considering controversial policy issues 
involving Muslims. Anti-prejudice norms are a potentially valuable resource in building public 
support for multicultural policy. In all three countries studied, citizens who express a stronger 
commitment to such norms expressed greater support for, or at least weaker discriminatory 
opposition to, Muslim schools. 
Commitments to social norms against prejudice show considerable power and robustness 
in shaping the national debate over Muslim integration. In the Swedish case, the strength of the 
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normative motivation is sufficient to eliminate discrimination in the aggregate, even though 
respondents in Sweden who reject such norms do also discriminate against Muslim schools. The 
aggregate pattern found in our Swedish data is consistent with a notion of principled, secularist 
opposition to religious schooling, with Swedish respondents rejecting both Muslim and Christian 
schools equally. 
The strong role for motivation to control prejudice in the Swedish sample suggests that 
the politics of prejudice are still highly relevant even in the absence of an aggregate-level gap in 
support for Muslim and Christian schools. Swedes who express little or no motivation to control 
prejudice still discriminate against Muslims. The absence of significant aggregate Muslim 
disadvantage reflects both that the level of motivation to control prejudice was higher overall in 
the Swedish sample compared to the other two countries, and that IMCP had a stronger effect on 
Swedes' support for Muslim schools. In other words, our Swedish respondents stand out for 
broader and deeper incorporation of Muslims under the protection of the anti-prejudice norm, at 
least on this policy question. 
However, while we have provided suggestive evidence that motivations to control 
prejudice can encourage more equal treatment of Muslim minorities in multiple European 
contexts, the limitations of our data mean that alternative possibilities cannot be fully ruled out. 
In particular, we lack the means in these data to fully tease apart the relative roles of motivations 
and underlying bias, or to fully rule out alternative interpretations of the effect captured by our 
IMCP measure from some of its correlates. For example, IMCP is correlated (by design) with 
more conventional explicit measures of prejudice. We argue for IMCP on theoretical grounds, as 
a better representation of validated dual process models of prejudice, and as a more precise 
concept than the usual measures of “explicit prejudice”. However, our available data cannot fully 
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exclude the possibility that the moderating effect of IMCP mixes together the impact of social 
norms as a conscious brake on discrimination with the mere absence of implicit or explicit 
hostility to minority groups.9 We cannot fully separate out these effects in this study, given the 
limited battery of items available on large multipurpose national-level surveys. In addition, 
although there is evidence from previous research that IMCP is a domain-specific measure, 
reflecting sensitivity to particular social norms sanctioning expressions of prejudice, we cannot 
determine in this study whether or not IMCP is in turn the product or expression of a broader 
form of political or social tolerance. This is not inconsistent with our view, but rather prompts 
further questions about the individual and societal sources of variation in IMCP that are beyond 
the scope of the present study. 
Finally, our results demonstrate the value of conducting cross-national survey 
experiments, as we uncovered significant differences in responses across contexts. The 
divergence between Sweden and Norway, and convergence between Norway and Britain instead, 
suggests that more entrenched multicultural politics may help mitigate discriminatory behaviour.  
This unusual pattern suggests that each society’s path of multicultural accommodation could be 
important in setting standards for how broadly and deeply anti-prejudice norms apply. Sweden 
and Norway differ most strikingly from one another in their approaches to multiculturalism, 
while being quite similar in numerous other social, political, and economic respects, including 
existing policy toward state-sponsored schools. Therefore, their divergence on preferences 
toward Muslim schools is striking. Sweden, with the strongest multicultural policies, also shows 
                                                          
9 In a dual process framework, explicit prejudice and IMCP are inherently and indeed causally 
related. Self-reported answers to explicit prejudice questions should be partially driven by IMCP, 
with respondents who score high on IMCP reporting less prejudice, because reporting prejudice 
violates the anti-racism norm they are motivated to follow. For this reason, it would require more 
detailed measures than typically available in national political attitude surveys to disentangle 
IMCP from explicit prejudice measures. 
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the strongest connection between anti-prejudice norms and discrimination against Muslim 
schools, while such norms show the weakest connection to views of Muslim schools in Norway. 
This striking national difference points to the need for further research, with attention to the 
nuance of comparative settings. It demonstrates the theoretical and empirical complexity of this 
issue, and in so doing underlines why we need to be careful about generalizing from one context 
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A1. Question wordings in all three countries 
 
A1.1 School Support Experiment 
 
 
Sweden: Some parents in Sweden would like to send their children to 
[Christian/Muslim/religious/private] schools that follow the same curriculum as other schools, 
[but are based on Christian values/teach Islam/are based on religious values/BLANK]  Do 




Some parents in Britain would like to send their children to [Muslim/Christian/Religious/Free] 
schools, which teach the same subjects as the national curriculum but are based on [Islamic 
religious/Christian religious/religious/their own particular] values. Do you agree that parents 
should be allowed to send their children to [Muslim/Christian/Religious/Free] schools? 
 
Norway:  
To what extent do you agree or disagree that it should allowed to send one's children to 
[Muslim/Christian/religious/private] schools which follow the same Norwegian curriculum as 
other schools? 
 
A1.2 Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice 
 
Sweden 
1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways because it is personally important to me 
2. I try to be unprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own convictions. 
3. I get irritated with myself when I have prejudiced thoughts. 
4. In my own view it is OK to use stereotypes about immigrants. 
 
Britain 
1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards Muslims because it is personally 
important to me 
2. I get angry with myself when I have a prejudiced thought. 
3. I try to be unprejudiced towards Muslims due to my own convictions 
4. I do not want to appear racist, even to myself.  
 
Norway 
1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally 
important to me 
2. I do not want to appear to be racist, not even to myself.  
3. I feel guilty if I think negatively about immigrants.  





A2. Full tables for all figures in paper 
 
Table A1: Experimental Treatment Effects: Support for Schools, by Type 
Corresponds to Figure 1 
 
    
School type (a) Sweden (b) Britain (c) Norway 
    
Muslim -0.059 -0.342*** -0.194*** 
 (0.047) (0.016) (0.021) 
Private 0.207*** -0.155*** 0.038+ 
 (0.047) (0.016) (0.021) 
Christian 0.452*** 0.624*** 0.606*** 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.015) 
    
Observations 391 2,221 1,555 
R-squared 0.078 0.168 0.091 
    
Cells contain OLS regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
Figure A2.  Sweden figure excluding messenger conditions for Christian and Muslims 
schools. 
 
Note: The Swedish data featured additional "messenger" political endorsement manipulations – 
figure A3 illustrates that our results are robust to analysis of a more limited dataset excluding 
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Table A3: Effects of IMCP on Support for Muslim and Christian Schools 
In each case, the no controls models correspond to the results plotted in Figure 2 
 
A3.1 - School type and IMCP interactions in Britain 
 
 Model 1: School type 
& IMCP interactions 
Model 2: School type & 
IMCP interactions, with 
controls 
   
Intercept 0.74 (0.03)*** 0.86 (0.05)*** 
   
School type  
(reference: Christian) 
  
Muslim -0.71 (0.04)*** -0.76 (0.05)*** 
Private -0.23 (0.04)*** -0.26 (0.04)*** 
   
IMCP  -0.20 (0.04)*** -0.28 (0.06)*** 




Muslim*IMCP 0.61 (0.07)*** 0.68 (0.07)*** 
Private*IMCP 0.13 (0.07) 0.14 (0.07)* 
   
Controls   
Views of Muslims  0.16 (0.03)*** 
Left-right attitudes  0.09 (0.04)* 
Religious affiliation (ref: 
Church of England) 
  
Catholic  0.07 (0.03)* 
Minority Christian  0.08 (0.02)** 
None  -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Party identification (ref: 
Conservative) 
  
Labour  -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Liberal Democrat  -0.08 (0.03)** 
UKIP/BNP  -0.06 (0.03)* 
Other  -0.08 (0.02)** 
None  -0.02 (0.02) 
   
R squared 0.20 0.26 
N 2217 1839 
    





Table A3.2: School type and IMCP interactions in Britain, excluding IMCP measures 
which reference Muslims 
 
 
 Model 1: School type & 
IMCP interactions 
Model 2: School type & 
IMCP interactions, with 
controls 
   
Intercept 0.58 (0.02)*** 0.68 (0.05)*** 
   
School type  
(reference: Christian) 
  
Muslim -0.51 (0.03)*** -0.56 (0.03)*** 
Private -0.17 (0.03)*** -0.20 (0.04)*** 
   
IMCP reduced -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.16 (0.04)** 




Muslim*IMCP reduced 0.40 (0.05)*** 0.47 (0.06)*** 
Private*IMCP reduced 0.08 (0.05) 0.12 (0.06) 
   
Controls   
Views of Muslims  -0.07 (0.03)* 
Left-right attitudes  0.05 (0.04) 
Religious affiliation (ref: 
Church of England) 
  
Catholic  0.07 (0.02)** 
Minority Christian  0.07 (0.03)** 
None  -0.08 (0.01)*** 
Party identification (ref: 
Conservative) 
  
Labour  -0.06 (0.02)** 
Liberal Democrat  -0.06 (0.03)* 
UKIP/BNP  -0.04 (0.02) 
Other  -0.06 (0.03) 
None  -0.01( 0.01) 
   
R squared 0.20 0.27 
N 2214 1773 
   







A3.3 - School type and IMCP interactions in Sweden* 
 Model 1:  Model 1b: 
Extended 
dataset 
Model 2:  Model 2b: 
Extended 
dataset 
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R squared 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.16 
N 391 1140 360 1054 
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*Note: The Swedish data featured additional "messenger" political endorsement manipulations - 
model 1b and 2b below illustrate that our results are robust to analysis of an extended dataset 




























A3.4: School type and IMCP interactions in Norway 
 
 Model 1: School type 
& IMCP interactions 




   
Intercept 0.63 (0.06)*** 0.69 (0.09)*** 
   
School type  
(reference: Christian) 
  
Muslim -0.36 (0.08)*** -0.36 (0.08)*** 
Private -0.03 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) 
   
IMCP  -0.04 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08) 
   
IMCP*school type interactions   
Muslim*IMCP 0.24 (0.12)* 0.24 (0.12)* 
Private*IMCP 0.12 (0.12) 0.06 (0.12) 
   
Controls   
Attitudes to Muslims  -0.13 (0.04)** 
Left-right self-placement  0.02 (0.006)** 
Religious background 
(reference: Church of Norway) 
  
Minority Christian  0.10 (0.02)* 
Other minority religion  0.26 (0.11)* 
No religion   -0.05 (0.02)* 
Male    0.01 (0.02) 
Education (ref: secondary 
qualifications) 
  
Primary or no qualifications  0.01 (0.02) 
Degree  -0.02 (0.03) 
Age (ref 18-29)   
30-59  0.04 (0.03) 
60 plus  0.06 (0.03) 
Vote preference (ref: Christian 
Democrats)  
  
Conservative  -0.07 (0.05) 
Progress   -0.11 (0.05)* 
Liberal  -0.02 (0.05) 
Socialist Left  -0.18 (0.06)*** 
Centre  -0.09 (0.07) 
Green  -0.16 (0.04)** 
Labour  -0.15 (0.04)*** 
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Red  -0.24 (0.08)** 
Would not vote  -0.11 (0.06) 
Not entitled to vote  -0.18 (0.07)** 
Other  -0.26 (0.08)** 
R squared 0.11 0.18 
N 1045 1032 
   
   
   
   
 
 
Table A4: Regression of IMCP and British support for Muslim schools, pre- and post-Paris 
attacks  
Model 3 corresponds to the results presented in Figure 4 
 
 
 Model 1:  
pre-post only  
Model 2:  
add IMCP 
Model 3:  
Add interaction  



















    
Observations 752 751 751 
R-squared 0.0003 0.109 0.122 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 















Table A5: Confessional and private governance of schools in Sweden, Norway 
and England, 2015/2016. 
 
        
  Sweden Norway England 
Confessional schools (N) 71 98 6,813 
Confessional schools (as % of all schools)  1.5 3.4 
37.0 (primary);  
19.0 (secondary) 
Privately owned schools (%) 17.0 6.3 9.5* 
"Academies" (%) 0.0 0.0 22.5 
Christian schools (N) 59 98 6150 
Muslim schools (N) 11 0 27 
Jewish Schools (N) 1 0 48 
Sikh schools (N) 0 0 11 
 
Other (N) 
 0 0 5 
Muslims schools (as % of confessional 
schools) 15.5 0 0.4 
*Fee paying "independent" schools in England 
England: Long, R and Bolton, P (2017) “Faith Schools in England: FAQs”, House of Commons 
Library; Department for Education (2016) “Schools, Pupils and their Characteristics” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2016. 
Sweden: “Grundskolan-Elever-Riksnivå. Tabell 2D: Skolenheter och elever läsåret 2016/17,” 
Sveriges Officiella statistic [Official statistics Sweden]. Norway: «Nøkkeltall for utdanning 
2015,» Statistisk Sentralbyrå [Statistics Norway]. https://www.ssb.no/utdanning/nokkeltall. In 
addition: Berglund, Jenny (2012). “Muslim schools in the Nordic countries” in Garcienne 
Lauwers, Jan De Groof, Paul De Hert, eds. Islam (Instruction) in State-Funded Schools, 















Table A6: Sample data compared to population data 
 
 Sweden Norway Britain 
 sample popn. sample  popn. sample popn. 
Age <30 16.5% 21.1% 12.1% 20.5% 15.5% 20.6% 
Age >60 20.3% 31.1% 32.3% 28.0% 34.4% 30.0% 
Gender (% male) 56.6% 49.9% 50.3% 50.0% 49.4% 49.6% 
Education (% tertiary degree) 54.5% 25.2% 60.1% 32.2% 26.3% 27.2% 
Notes: Age entries indicate proportion of adult population; Education entries indicate proportion of population aged 
25-64. 
 
Sources: OECD, Statistics Sweden, Høgestøl, and Skjervheim (2015), ONS (UK) 
 
